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ABSTRACT
Studies investigating earnings management in banks have been particularly concerned with the use of Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) and 
mainly use two-stage models to identify discretionary management actions. Another type of record that has received attention from 
researchers in identifying discretionary management actions is the classification and measurement of the fair value of securities. In this 
case, however, one-stage models have prevailed. The present study aims to develop and validate a two-stage model for the identification 
of discretionary management actions using gains obtained from securities. Our model incorporates macroeconomic indicators and spe-
cific attributes of the securities portfolios to the traditional parameters used in models previously utilized in the literature. To validate the 
proposed model, the results are compared with the results from the estimation of a one-stage model - a methodology widely used in the 
literature. Tests conducted with the two models reveal evidence of income smoothing using securities and the classification of available-
for-sale securities among the actions taken by management. The consistency of the results across the two models validates the proposed 
model, thereby contributing to the development of research on the topic that is not only concerned with determining whether earnings 
management is practiced but also whether it can be associated with other variables. We also find that  securities-based earnings manage-
ment is more significant in smaller-sized banks and in banks controlled by private capital.
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 1 InTRoduCTIon
Empirical research on accounting choices, manipu-
lation of accounting information, and earnings manage-
ment is an area that has received a lot of attention from 
researchers evaluating the use of financial information 
in the capital markets (Kothari, 2001; Fields, Lys, & Vin-
cent, 2001).
Different methodological procedures have been used 
to identify methods of earnings management. Although 
some studies have used frequency distributions (histo-
grams), the empirical literature on the subject has been 
dominated by the analysis of the behavior of accruals, 
particularly those related to discretionary management 
actions (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Several econometric 
models have been developed to measure discretion. Ac-
cording to Paulo (2007), the most prominent models 
were developed by Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), and 
Jones (1991). In addition, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 
(1995) developed the Modified Jones, and Kang and Si-
varamakrishnan (1995) developed a model known as the 
KS. In general, these models attempt to segregate total 
accruals that are determined by discretionary manage-
ment in response to incentives and that are applied to 
various economic segments.
Despite the numerous studies on the subject that use 
these models, several methodological limitations have 
been highlighted in the literature, including the diffi-
culty of detecting and measuring earnings management 
practices (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995), the limi-
tations of econometric models in capturing the recog-
nition of accruals by discretionary management (Paulo, 
2007; Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez, 2008), and the fact 
that abnormal accruals, used as a parameter of discretion 
and as a proxy for earnings management, are influenced 
by unusual non-discretionary factors (Healy, 1996; Ber-
nard & Skinner, 1996).
As a means of dealing with the limitations of econo-
metric models, another branch of earnings management 
research has focused on the analysis of specific accruals. 
According to Martinez (2001) and Cheng, Warfield, and 
Ye (2011), focusing on the analysis of specific accounts 
(or of an industry) creates an opportunity for a more con-
sistent and proper model for the problem in question. 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) and McNichols 
(2000), the use of this method, which produces empirical 
evidence regarding accounts used for earnings manage-
ment, has the best potential in terms of advancing the li-
terature on the subject.
Because of its particular characteristics, the banking 
industry is a favorable environment for the develop-
ment of studies based on specific accruals. For Kanaga-
retnam, Krishnan, and Lobo (2010), the use of specific 
accruals in an industry such as banking enables a more 
appropriate segregation of discretionary and non-dis-
cretionary components and allows to control for other 
determinants of cross-sectional differences in accruals, 
increasing the reliability of inferences from empirical 
analyses. These studies are particularly focused on the 
analysis of the process of determining Loan Loss Provi-
sions (LLP), which Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Mathieu 
(2003) justify by arguing that these allowances generally 
represent banks' largest accruals and thus play a key role 
in managers’ decisions about possible accounting mani-
pulations. According to Alali and Jaggi (2010), there is a 
widespread belief in the market that bank managers use 
LLP extensively to manipulate published earnings and 
that LLP has been a focus of concern for regulators.
In addition to LLP, another type of record often 
studied to identify earnings management practices in 
financial institutions is the classification and measure-
ment of the fair value of securities and the selection of 
the timing of their sale, which affects the profits and los-
ses associated with these assets. According to Beatty, Ke, 
and Petroni (2002), research has shown that these are 
the two bank earnings components that are most subject 
to manipulation.
Among the studies conducted on the banking in-
dustry focusing on the analysis of LLP and securities 
portfolios, one difference stands out. When the focus 
is on LLP, most studies use two-stage models - the first 
stage identifies the discretionary portion, as represen-
ted by the error term of the non-discretionary por-
tion of the specification model, and the second stage 
evaluates the association between this discretion and 
the variables of interest for management. In the case 
of studies on securities, however, one-stage models are 
commonly used. This approach means that the portion 
resulting from managerial discretion is not identified; 
the association between the total accruals from securi-
ties and the income variables that eliminate those ac-
cruals is evaluated to ascertain whether the financial 
institution uses accruals with securities to achieve the 
goals of the managers. The use of one-stage models 
may hinder the development of studies where infor-
mation concerning the extent of discretion practiced 
by the institutions at any particular time is required. 
Additionally, it is important to consider that there are 
two parts to the process of measuring financial instru-
ments. The first relates to the recognition of interest 
for the period (where necessary) with little opportunity 
for a manager to exercise discretion in earnings mani-
pulation. The second part concerns the updating of an 
instrument's fair value, which provides a manager the 
opportunity to exercise more discretion to manipulate 
an institution's earnings. Thus, it is recommended that 
discretionary and non-discretionary portions be sepa-
rated in the empirical evaluation of securities-based 
earnings management.
Given this backdrop, we investigate the following rese-
arch question: Does the use of a two-stage model for iden-
tifying the discretionary actions of managers of financial 
institutions in evaluating securities provide consistent re-
sults with the one-stage models that were more commonly 
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used in previous research?
In order to address this problem, the present study 
aims at validating a two-stage model for the identifica-
tion of discretionary activity by financial institutions 
using securities accruals while attempting to improve 
on the few models with these characteristics identified 
in the literature. To that end, the few contributions 
from studies on the subject in the banking field are 
considered, and the precepts are adopted for the deve-
lopment of two-stage models for LLP; also, the charac-
teristics of securities portfolios are taken into account. 
The validation of the proposed model is performed by 
comparing calculated results with the results found 
using a one-stage model, given the establishment in the 
literature of this type of model for securities-based ear-
nings management in banks. This validation procedu-
re seeks to avoid the problem highlighted by Lobo and 
Yang (2001), who attribute the existence of conflicting 
empirical results in studies on earnings management to 
the use of different models and the lack of methodolo-
gical consensus among researchers.
Empirical tests were conducted using data from the 
Quarterly Financial Statements (QFS) of commercial 
banks, multiple-purpose banks, and savings banks ope-
rating in Brazil from the third quarter of 2002 to the 
fourth quarter of 2010. These data are available on the 
website of the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do 
Brasil - BCB).
Despite the concern expressed by Goldberger (1961) 
regarding underestimation of the absolute value of the 
regression coefficients in the second stage, the valida-
tion of a two-stage model to identify discretionary ac-
tivity in the assessment and classification of a securities 
portfolio contributes to the development of research on 
the topic by not only aiming to ascertain whether ear-
nings management is practiced but also by identifying 
the level of discretion that is applied. Moreover, this re-
search can contribute to the development of studies in 
which banks’ discretionary management activity regar-
ding their securities portfolios is one of the elements 
that is considered.
  2 ThEoRETICAl FRAMEwoRK
As a theoretical basis for the development of the 
model, the following topics are discussed: earnings ma-
nagement practices in financial institutions; the use of 
the securities portfolio for this practice; a review of the 
studies on the use of securities by banks in earnings 
management practice; and the use of two-stage models 
to identify the discretionary management activities of 
banking institutions.
 2.1  Earnings-Management Practices in 
Financial Institutions.
According to Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian 
(2006), the study of earnings management in the fi-
nancial system is particularly important because of the 
impact that problems in banking institutions may have 
on the economy. This view is supported by the 2008 
financial crisis when major banks considered “too big 
to fail” were rescued by national governments at a time 
of widespread distrust to avoid even more devastating 
consequences for financial systems and the global eco-
nomy. Furthermore, according to Cheng, Warfield, and 
Ye (2011), the effects of this crisis increase the need to 
study earnings management practices in the banking 
industry because banks play such a critical role in the 
economy.
Goulart (2007) states that one of the foundations of 
a sound financial system is transparency, which is why 
international agencies and the central banks of various 
nations demand that financial institutions disclose in-
formation that appropriately demonstrates their equity, 
as well as their financial and earnings situations, besides 
other aspects, such as organizational structure, internal 
controls, and risk management. The assumption is that 
this transparency requirement is mainly met by the fi-
nancial statements. According to the author, however, 
earnings management practices may harm the disclosu-
re of the real situation in these organizations.
In addition to concerns about possible manipulation 
to conceal a situation that could damage the financial 
health of an institution and the need to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry among an institution’s shareholders, 
the issue of earnings management in banking institu-
tions involves another important aspect, highlighted by 
Marcondes (2008): earnings management’s impact on 
market discipline. The author has shown empirically 
that accounting manipulation, as measured by discre-
tionary accruals, influences the reduction of interest 
rates negotiated between banks and depositors, genera-
ting benefits for the financial institutions that use this 
practice - they pay lower interest rates to depositors 
than risk indicators would suggest without such accru-
als, thus exerting the transfer of income between these 
agents.
 2.2  The use of the Securities Portfolio for 
Earnings Management in Banks.
As noted in the introduction, studies on earnings ma-
nagement in financial institutions focus on specific accru-
al models, concentrating in particular on the analysis of 
LLPs. Another subject that raises concern in regard to the 
possibility of manipulation of the financial statements of 
banking institutions is the classification and measurement 
of the fair value of securities. Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) 
have demonstrated that these are the two components of 
bank earnings that are most subject to manipulation.
In regard to the classification of securities, mana-
gers can affect an institution’s earnings by selecting the 
category into which securities are rated according to 
José Alves Dantas, Otávio Ribeiro de Medeiros, Fernando Caio Galdi e Fábio Moraes da Costa
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 24, n. 61, p. 37-54, jan./fev./mar./abr.  201340
 Table 1   Securities categories and evaluation parameters
Rating category Evaluation criterion Recognition of the effects
Trading securities Fair value Current profit or loss 
Available-for-sale securities Fair value Equity
Held-to-maturity securities Amortized cost Current profit or loss
Source: Circular BCB 3.068/2001.
the criteria defined by the BCB, through Circular 3.068 
of 11/08/2001, summarized in Table 1. Because evalu-
ation parameters and the impact on earnings are diffe-
rent depending on the category in which the securities 
are rated, managers may use this prerogative to practice 
earnings management. It is noteworthy that the recent 
changes introduced by the International Financial Re-
porting Standard - IFRS 9, estimated to become effec-
tive January 1, 2015, modifies this classification system 
and the criteria for evaluation and recognition, but its 
guidelines are not considered in the present study be-
cause they have not yet been approved by the regula-
tory framework set by BCB, and even if they had, their 
effective term would not fall within the timescale of the 
present research.
Regarding fair value measurement, Fiechter and 
Meyer (2010) note that the process of valuing financial 
instruments at fair value is complex, particularly when 
they are or they become illiquid; such valuations are ba-
sed on subjective conditions that are difficult to verify 
and involve a considerable degree of uncertainty. In such 
situations, the use of pricing models is required with the 
difficulties inherent in the definition of assumptions 
(Goulart, 2007). This approach contributes to an en-
vironment that is conducive to the management of fi-
nancial information, comprehensive disclosure require-
ments notwithstanding (Fiechter & Meyer, 2010). Nissim 
(2003) also notes that although fair value is increasingly 
recommended by regulators and demanded by users of 
financial statements as the basis of accounting measure-
ment, criticisms remain as to the potential uncertainty 
when there is no market price for the asset.
In the financial crisis of 2008, for example, the uns-
table environment led the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC, 2008) to disseminate an alert to 
help auditors verify the fair value of financial instru-
ments, in which concern regarding the degree of un-
certainty in the absence of an active fair value was hi-
ghlighted. According to IFAC, this uncertainty creates 
a natural tendency to bias in management's judgment, 
where management presents a more favorable scenario 
than reality dictates, requiring the auditor to identify 
indicators of possible management bias.
 2.3  Studies on the use of Securities for Earnings 
Management in Banks.
The use of the securities portfolio for earnings or ca-
pital management by banking institutions has received 
a good deal of attention from accounting researchers, 
especially regarding the practice of income smoothing, 
both internationally and in the Brazilian market.
The following studies can be highlighted in the in-
ternational realm: Moyer (1990) found no evidence of 
the use of profits and losses from securities for capi-
tal management; Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo 
(1995) and Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Mathieu (2003, 
2004) found income smoothing in earnings manage-
ment, usually jointly and complementarily with the es-
tablishment of LLP; Beatty and Harris (1999), Beatty, 
Ke, and Petroni (2002) and Shrieves and Dahl (2003) 
confirmed that publicly traded banks engage in earnin-
gs management practices using profits and losses on 
securities more than privately held companies; Fiechter 
and Meyer (2010) found that banks engaged in discre-
tionary evaluations of Level 3 financial instruments - 
those that display a higher degree of subjectivity given 
the absence of active markets - during the financial 
crisis of 2008 with the purpose of practicing big bath 
accounting (characterized by the anticipation of ex-
penditures that need not be recognized in the ongoing 
fiscal year, thus creating conditions for increased fu-
ture earnings); Quagli and Ricciardi (2010) found that 
European banks have used new options for the rerating 
of financial instruments provided by the October 2008 
amendment to the International Accounting Standard 
- IAS 39 for earnings management practices but not for 
the level of capitalization.
In the Brazilian market, Zenderski (2005), Montei-
ro, and Grateron (2006), Santos (2007), Xavier (2007), 
Goulart (2007), Baggio, Monteiro, and Toda (2007), 
and Gabriel and Corrar (2010) also evaluated the use 
of management discretion in relation to the classifi-
cation and measurement of the fair value of securities 
portfolios for the purposes of earnings or capital ma-
nagement.
Evidence of the practice of income smoothing by 
Brazilian banking institutions with the use of discre-
tion in the establishment of LLP and in adjustments in 
the fair value of securities, jointly and complementari-
ly were found by Zenderski (2005) and Santos (2007). 
Goulart (2007) also found evidence of earnings manage-
ment using LLP, the evaluation of securities, and income 
from derivatives with the caveat that income smoothing 
using securities operations was only confirmed in cases 
of positive adjustments to the value of securities.
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An analysis of the impact of adopting fair value for 
the measurement of securities was conducted by Mon-
teiro and Grateron (2006) in June 2002. The authors 
concluded that there was a decrease in volatility, and 
they showed evidence of income smoothing using fair 
value adjustments of securities by the banking institu-
tions studied. In a later study using semiannual data 
from 2002 to 2005, Baggio, Monteiro, and Toda (2007) 
found that the volatility of the equity of banks has in-
creased since the adoption of the fair value criterion for 
the measurement of financial instruments.
The hypothesis of earnings management using pre-
miums on investments in subsidiaries and associates, 
securities operations, loan loss provisions, and con-
tingent liabilities was analyzed by Xavier (2007), who 
found that 55% of the assessed banks used securities 
classification for earnings management. 
Gabriel and Corrar (2010) adopted a two-stage 
model for identifying the discretionary and non-dis-
cretionary portions of fair value adjustments to secu-
rities portfolios to assess whether Brazilian banks use 
the prerogative of fair value adjustments in measuring 
securities for earnings and capital management. The 
authors concluded that managers of financial institu-
tions use fair value adjustments as a method for prac-
ticing earnings management and for the management 
of equity levels. As a caveat, it should be noted that in 
the second stage, a positive relationship was observed 
between the discretionary portion of fair value adjust-
ments and quarterly earnings, contrary to the evidence 
of income smoothing in the Brazilian market found by 
Zenderski (2005), Monteiro and Grateron (2006), San-
tos (2007), and Goulart (2007).
 2.4  use of Two-Stage Models for Identification 
of Securities-Based Earnings Management
According to Goulart (2007), for the analysis of speci-
fic accruals for earnings management, such as profits and 
losses on securities, the following can be adopted as rese-
arch procedures: (i) the estimation and analysis of the re-
lationship with accounting earnings, herein referred to as 
the one-stage model, to identify the possible use of inco-
me smoothing, and (ii) the use of a model to estimate the 
discretionary component of the specific account under 
analysis, known as a two-stage model. The differences be-
tween the two procedures are that in the two-stage model, 
first, the discretionary portion of the dependent variable 
is identified and is represented by the error term of the 
specification model for the non-discretionary portion, 
and second, the relationship between this discretionary 
portion and the variables of interest for earnings mana-
gement are evaluated. In an one-stage model there is no 
separation of the discretionary portion.
In the literature concerning the use of income from secu-
rities for earnings or capital-level management in financial 
institutions, the one-stage model has prevailed. In the studies 
listed in the previous section, for example, only four - Beatty 
and Harris (1999), Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002), Fiechter 
and Meyer (2010), and Gabriel and Corrar (2010) - used 
two-stage models where the discretionary portion was first 
identified, represented by the error term of the specification 
model for the non-discretionary portion, and the association 
between this discretionary activity and the variables of inte-
rest in the study was subsequently evaluated.
A summary of the models used for specifying the 
non-discretionary portion of income from securities is 
shown in Table 2.
 Table 2   Summary of the specification models of the non-discretionary portion of income from securities in banks
Study Dependent variable Independent variables
Beatty and Harris 
(1999)
Realized profits on securities Total assets (natural log); positive result before taxes and realized income from securities 
(dummy); publicly traded bank (dummy), capital (tier 1) without realized income from securi-
ties; unrealized income from securities; period (control).
Beatty, Ke, and 
Petroni (2002)
Realized profits and losses on 
securities
Total assets (natural log); unrealized profits and losses on securities at t-1.
Fiechter and 
Meyer (2010)
Unrealized profits and losses on 
Level 3 securities
Position of Level 3 assets at t-1; market-to-book ratio at t-1; total assets (natural log) at t-1; 
leverage (debt / assets) at t-1; LLP, non-financial income; period (control); classification of the 
institution in the banking industry (dummy).
Gabriel and 
Corrar (2010)
Adjustment to total fair value of tra-
ding and available-for-sale securities
Variation in trading and available-for-sale securities; adjustment to the total fair value of the 
trading and available-for-sale securities at t-1. 
A common procedure adopted in the four models is 
the scaling of monetary variables, which is the case for 
all dependent and some independent variables – e.g., 
capital, income, position of Level 3 assets, LLP, varia-
tion in the balance of securities, and fair value adjust-
ments. The differences are in relation to the scaling 
parameters used: Beatty and Harris (1999) and Gabriel 
and Corrar (2010) used total assets; Beatty, Ke, and Pe-
troni (2002) used total assets at the beginning of the 
period, and Fiechter and Meyer (2010) used equity at 
the beginning of the period.
Regarding the relevance of the models for capturing the 
non-discretionary portion of the income from securities and 
consequently managerial discretion (the error term), it is 
important to stress that consideration of some independent 
variables in the specification of what would be the "non-dis-
cretionary" portion of income from securities may be ques-
tionable. Such variables as the size of the institution, income 
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before profits and losses from securities, type of institution 
(publicly traded or private), level of capitalization, market-
to-book ratio, leverage, and loan loss provision, for example, 
seem to more adequately constitute evidence of managerial 
discretion than a "natural" relationship of the dimension of 
income from securities. This property is especially the case 
in the models of Beatty and Harris (1999) and Fiechter and 
Meyer (2010). Although the need to meet specific research 
interests may justify the inclusion of these types of variables 
in the models, it is perhaps incorrect to isolate the impact of 
these variables from the error term and to call them discre-
tionary or non-discretionary portions.
In the case of the Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) and 
Gabriel and Corrar (2010) models, the small number 
of explanatory variables must be emphasized becau-
se they are the determinants of the non-discretionary 
portion of the accruals. A likely consequence is the 
contamination of the error portion, which represents 
the discretionary actions of management. Although the 
limitations of econometric models in capturing mana-
gerial discretion in the recognition of accruals are an 
issue addressed by several authors (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1995; Healy, 1996; Bernard & Skinner, 1996; 
Paulo, 2007; Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez, 2008), the 
greater exposure to risk from omitted variables may 
exacerbate this type of problem. This exposure may be 
the reason, for example, for the contradictory results 
found by Gabriel and Corrar (2010) in regard to the 
income smoothing hypothesis in the Brazilian market, 
as outlined in Section 2.3.
 3 METhodologICAl PRoCEduRES
Given the purpose of this study, the methodological 
procedures consist of the specification of a two-stage mo-
del aiming to show the use of discretion in income from 
securities and to provide a validation test of the model, 
comparing its results with those of a one-stage model.
In constructing the proposed operational model, 
an analytical research approach was used, focusing on 
the modeling of financial and economic phenomena to 
generate empirically testable hypotheses (Paulo, 2007). 
According to Demski (2005), the construction of a mo-
del should be a product of analytical research with the 
application of a logical and deductive process. Ronen 
and Yaari (2008) highlight several concepts and models 
used for this purpose, particularly in analytical resear-
ch aiming to identify earnings management practices.
 3.1  Two-Stage Model for discretion over 
Securities.
Based on arguments put forward by Beatty and Harris 
(1999), Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002), Fiechter and Meyer 
(2010), and Gabriel and Corrar (2010) mentioned in the 
theoretical framework section, the models developed to 
determine discretionary LLP in banks - such as in Kana-
garetnam, Lobo, and Mathieu (2003, 2004), Zenderski 
(2005), Alali and Jaggi (2010), and Kanagaretnam, Krish-
nan, and Lobo (2010) - and to gather information regar-
ding securities portfolios available in the QFS of Brazilian 
banks, the following model was developed to identify the 
discretionary portion of income from securities:
IncSECi,t = β0 + βi + β1SECi,t-1 + β2ΔSECi,t +
            β3BIRt + β4GDPt + β5EXCHt + β6IBOVt + 
            ψ1 <TYPi,t>+ ψ2 <MATi,t> + 
                  ψ3 <CONi,t> + εi,t ,        3.1
where
IncSECi,t: Income from bank securities i at period t, scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of period t;
SECi,t-1: Portfolio balance of bank securities i at period t-1, 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of period t-1;
ΔSECi,t: Change in the securities portfolio of bank i betwe-
en periods t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the begin-
ning of period t;
BIRt: Base interest rate of the economy in real terms in 
quarter t - Selic rate, deflated by the Extended National 
Consumer Price Index (Índice de Preços ao Consumi-
dor Amplo - IPCA);
GDPt: Gross Domestic Product variation from base values 
for period t;
EXCHt: Brazilian real exchange rate variation at period t - 
free exchange rate of the U.S. dollar (sale), deflated by 
the IPCA;
IBOVt: Ibovespa index (Sao Paulo Stock Exchange Index - 
Índice da Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo) variation at 
period t, deflated by the IPCA;
<TYPi,t>: Vector of variables representing the proportion 
of the bank's securities portfolio i at period t, repre-
sented in five investment categories: Brazilian govern-
ment securities (títulos públicos federais - TPF), state 
or municipal securities (títulos públicos estaduais ou 
municipais (STMN), Bank Deposit Certificates (Cer-
tificado de Depósito Bancário – CDB), real estate, and 
mortgage bonds (CDBB), debentures and shares (DE-
BSH), and other securities (OS);
<MATi,t>: Vector of variables representing the proportion 
of the bank's securities portfolio i at period t, distri-
buted according to the maturity date of the securities: 
without maturity date (WMD), maturity in up to 12 
months (U12M), maturity in over 1 and up to 5 ye-
ars (U5Y), maturity in between 5 and 15 years (U15Y), 
and maturity in more than 15 years (M15Y);
<CONi,t>: Vector of variables representing the degree of 
concentration of the bank's securities portfolio i at pe-
riod t, identifying the proportion of the portfolio ap-
plied to: governmental issuers (GOV), the 10 largest 
private issuers (L10PR), the following 50 largest private 
issuers (L50PR), the following 100 largest private is-
suers (L100PR), and other private issuers (OPR); and
εi,t: Disturbance or error term, assuming normality of resi-
duals, i.e., ~ N(0, σ2), which represents the discretionary 
portion of income from securities of bank i at period t.
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The construction of the model designed to identi-
fy discretionary accruals related to the measurement of 
the securities portfolio at fair value initially considers 
that the non-discretionary portion of this income is re-
lated to the portfolio balance at the end of the previous 
period (SEC(-1)) and to the variation in the current period 
(ΔSEC). The analytical assumption behind the inclusion 
of these variables is that the portion of income from secu-
rities that is explained by the portfolio balance cannot be 
understood as a discretionary management action becau-
se it is usual that a larger volume of resources invested in 
securities will generate higher income. Gabriel and Corrar 
(2010) use a similar approach with two exceptions: first, 
instead of using the portfolio balance from the previous 
period, they use the fair value adjustment. Second, the 
focus of those authors is specifically on the trading and 
available-for-sale securities portfolio. In addition to the 
analytical assumptions outlined and those from Gabriel 
and Corrar's (2010) study, the inclusion of these variables 
is also based by analogy on studies designed to identify 
discretionary LLPs in banks (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Ma-
thieu, 2003, 2004; Zenderski, 2005; Alali & Jaggi, 2010; 
Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, & Lobo, 2010), which incorpo-
rate the explanatory variables of expenditures on this type 
of provision in a given period, including the balance of 
loans overdue in the previous period, the variation in the 
balance of matured loans, and the variation in the balance 
of the loan portfolio, among others.
Regarding the variable ΔSEC, it is important to note a 
limitation due to the type of information available. It would 
be more appropriate to identify securities relative to effecti-
ve purchases and sales, rather than the variation in the ba-
lance of the portfolio, which includes profits and losses for 
the period. In any case, even with this limitation, the varia-
tion of the portfolio is considered an appropriate proxy for 
the buying and selling of securities in the period. Thus, we 
start from the premise that the measurement of profits and 
losses on the securities has a relatively uniform association 
with the portfolio balance. The limitation highlighted lays 
in the fact that in times of crisis, this assumption may be 
compromised.
To improve the model’s specification while seeking 
to minimize the error term - which represents the dis-
cretionary portion of the IncSEC - other explanatory 
variables that are associated with the non-discretiona-
ry portion of income from securities are included in 
the model. Thus, in addition to the portfolio balance 
in the previous month and the proxy for movements 
during the period, variables regarding the base interest 
rate of the economy (BIR), the level of economic gro-
wth (GDP), the exchange rate variation (EXCH), the 
Ibovespa variation (IBOV), the types of securities that 
comprise the portfolio (TYP), the maturity dates of the 
securities (MAT), and the degree of concentration by 
issuer (CON) are all included.
The justification for incorporating the base interest rate 
of the economy (BIR) among the explanatory variables for 
income from securities is that TPFs have significant par-
ticipation in the Brazilian securities market. Moreover, a 
change in the level of real interest rates will be reflected in 
the pricing of other securities in the market by affecting the 
expectations of market agents. Thus, it is assumed that the 
behavior of IncSEC explained by the BIR variable cannot 
be attributed to managerial discretion. As for the expected 
sign for this relationship, different effects are predicted ba-
sed on the composition of the portfolio: for floating-rate 
securities indexed to the Selic rate, a change in the level of 
interest rates has a positive effect; for securities with pre-
fixed interest rates, changes in the interest rate of the eco-
nomy should be reflected in a decrease in fair value. The 
predicted relationship between the base interest rate of the 
economy and income from securities was first proposed by 
Shrieves and Dahl (2003), Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, 
& Rhee (2005), and Santos (2007).
In the case of the GDP variable, the assumption is 
that the behavior of the economy affects the value of se-
curities, including the earnings from marketing actions 
of management, which are a possible trade-off with the 
loan portfolio. This assumption is based by analogy on 
the formulations of Shrieves and Dahl (2003) and Gray 
and Clarke (2004), which associated LLP in banking 
institutions with the level of economic activity repre-
sented by the GDP variation. For the present study, we 
consider that in periods of great economic activity, for 
example, the demand for loans will increase, leading 
bank operations to be more profitable than income 
from securities and thus reducing the proportion of in-
come from securities in relation to total assets. Thus, 
a negative relationship is expected between income 
from securities and the level of economic activity re-
presented by the variation in gross domestic product. 
We consider that the variation in income from secu-
rities that is explained by the behavior of the variable 
GDP cannot be credited to the opportunistic action of 
management.
The EXCH variable is included to capture the im-
pact of exchange rate variation on the fair value of se-
curities. The assumption is that the value of securities 
should react positively to changes in the exchange rate 
and such changes in the fair value of securities should 
not be attributed to the discretionary actions of bank 
managers, who have no control over this element. A 
positive association is expected between the IncSEC 
and EXCH variables because a negative impact of a po-
sitive exchange rate variation on the income of banking 
institutions can only be associated with short positions 
in foreign currencies, particularly in derivative trading, 
and not with a securities portfolio.
For the IBOV variable, we consider that the behavior 
of the capital market affects the evaluation of securities 
because the financial instruments traded therein com-
prise the bank's securities portfolio. Obviously, the inco-
me obtained by a banking institution from its securities 
portfolio as a result of changes in the capital market in-
dex cannot be associated with discretionary managerial 
behavior. We expect that the relationship between Inco-
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meSEC and IBOV will be positive, which is consistent 
with the assumptions of Shrieves and Dahl (2003), Aga-
rwal et al. (2005), and Santos (2007).
Regarding the use of vectors to represent characteris-
tics of the portfolio (TYP, MAT, and CON), we base the 
present study on the works of Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, 
and Lobo (2010) and Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo 
(2010), which used the parameters of the loan portfolios 
of banks to estimate their LLPs. Regarding the type of 
securities that comprise the portfolio, TYP, the aim is to 
capture the effects of behavioral differences in the fair 
value of securities as a function of the composition of 
the portfolio of each bank, particularly in relation to the 
type of financial instrument and the issuer. For the matu-
rity of the securities comprising the portfolio, MAT, the 
assumption is that the effect on the fair value of financial 
instruments differs according to maturity, i.e., shorter-
term securities are less subject to market risk and thus 
less susceptible to volatility resulting from changes in 
overall economic conditions. To measure the concentra-
tion of the securities portfolio, the vector of variables 
CON, the understanding is that because the portfolio’s 
concentration represents a measure of risk, it is impor-
tant to control its effects in relation to the assessment of 
the fair value of the portfolio, bearing in mind that a fi-
nancial institution that has concentrated its investments 
in securities from few issuers may behave differently in 
relation to the assessment of the fair value of its portfolio 
than a bank that has a more diversified portfolio.
For the abovementioned reasons, variations in inco-
me from securities that may be attributed to the cha-
racteristics of the type of security that comprises the 
portfolio, the maturity of such securities, and the degree 
of concentration by issuer are considered non-discretio-
nary, i.e., they cannot be attributed to an opportunis-
tic action of management. Regarding the variables that 
comprise the vectors, the expected behaviors for each 
also cannot be attributed. The behaviors’ aim is limited 
to controlling their effects on the behavior of the depen-
dent variable, IncSEC.
In summary, the process of estimating the non-discre-
tionary portion of income from securities, proposed in 
Model (3.1), considers the variables and relationships sho-
wn in Table 3.
 Table 3   Summary of expected relationships in explaining the non-discretionary portion of income from securities (IncSEC) 
in the estimation of the Model (3.1)
Variable Expected non-discretionary behavior Sign
SEC(-1) The balance of the securities portfolio in the previous period is a determinant of the income from securities during the period in 
question.
+
ΔSEC The variation in the balance of the securities portfolio has an effect on the income from securities during the period. +
BIR The base interest rate of the economy, in real terms, influences the fair value of securities and consequently the income from securi-
ties.
?
GDP The level of economic activity negatively affects the income from securities due to the opportunity for more profitable operations in 
times of greater dynamism.
-
EXCH The exchange rate variation positively influences the income from securities by providing a higher value to securities denominated 
in a foreign currency.
+
IBOV The variation in the capital market index positively affects the fair value of securities and consequently the income from securities. +
TYP Different categories of investments in securities affect the income from securities differently and should be controlled. ?
MAT Differences in the maturities of the securities that comprise the portfolio affect the income from securities differently and should be 
controlled.
?
CON The different levels of concentration of the portfolios by issuer affect the income from securities differently and should be controlled. ?
 3.2  Procedure for Model Validation Test (3.1).
Considering the evidence obtained by Zenderski 
(2005), Monteiro and Grateron (2006), Santos (2007), 
and Goulart (2007) that Brazilian banking institutions 
have used securities operations to promote income 
smoothing, the procedures adopted for Model Valida-
tion (3.1) comprise the following: (i) estimation of a 
one-stage model to confirm the expected hypothesis of 
income smoothing, and (ii) the specification of the se-
cond stage of Model (3.1) to confirm whether the results 
regarding income smoothing are consistent with the re-
sults obtained from the one-stage model.
For validation purposes, therefore, Model (3.2) was 
used as a reference to confirm the hypothesis of income 
smoothing:
IncSECi,t= β0 + βi + β1(NPi,t - IncSECi,t)+ β2ΔEVAi,t +
           β3SECi,t + β4BIRt + β5GDPt + β6EXCHt + 
                β7IBOV + β8NACi + β9PRVi+β10lnTAi,t + εi,t ,      3.2
where
NPi,t: Net profit of bank i at period t, scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of period t;
ΔEVAi,t: Change in the Equity Valuation Adjustment ac-
count of bank i between periods t-1 and t, scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of period t;
NACi: Dummy variable, assuming a value of 1 for financial 
institutions i under the control of national capital and 
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0 for the others;
PRVi: Dummy variable, assuming a value of 1 for private 
equity financial institutions i and 0 for the others; and
lnTAi,t: Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank i at pe-
riod t, deflated by the IPCA.
For the construction of this model, variables used in 
studies cited in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 were included - in par-
ticular, Shrieves and Dahl (2003) and Santos (2007), who 
inspired the inclusion of the variables NP-IncSEC, BIR, 
IBOV, PRV, and lnTA - and in the assumptions discussed in 
the development of Model (3.1). 
The hypothesis of earnings management aimed at inco-
me smoothing is confirmed if a negative relationship be-
tween the dependent variable and net profit prior to gains 
and losses from securities (NP-IncSEC) is demonstrated. 
That is, income from securities increases (decreases) when 
earnings before profits and losses from securities are lower 
(higher). A negative sign for the variable ΔEVA means that 
banks use the classification of the available-for-sale secu-
rities portfolio as a management tool. In addition to these 
two variables of interest and the balance of the securities in 
the portfolio (SEC), control variables are included. The base 
interest rate (BIR), the exchange rate variation (EXCH), the 
behavior of the capital market (IBOV), and the level of eco-
nomic growth (GDP) are included to capture their effects 
on the valuation of the securities portfolio for the same rea-
sons that justified their inclusion in Model (3.1). In the case 
of variables NAC, PRV, and lnTA, the aim is to identify and 
control behavioral differences in the process of fair value 
measurement and the classification of the securities portfo-
lio in relation to the characteristics of financial institutions 
according to the origin of capital control - national/foreign 
bank and private/government-owned - and the size of the 
institution.
Considering this context, Table 4 summarizes the ex-
pected results in the estimation of income from securities 
according to Model (3.2):
 Table 4   Summary of expected relationships in explaining the income from securities (IncSEC) using Model (3.2)
Variable Expected relationship Sign
NP-IncSEC Income from securities increases (decreases) when earnings before profits and losses from securities are lower (higher), confirming 
the hypothesis of earnings management.
-
ΔEVA The use of the classification of the available-for-sale portfolio as a tool for earnings management is reflected in the negative rela-
tionship between the income from securities and variation in the Equity Valuation Adjustment account.
-
SEC The balance of the securities portfolio has an effect on the amount of income from securities in the period. +
BIR The base interest rate of the economy, in real terms, has an effect on the fair value of securities and consequently the income from 
securities.
?
GDP The level of economic activity negatively affects the income from securities due to the opportunity for more profitable operations 
in times of greater dynamism.
-
EXCH The exchange rate variation positively affects the income from securities by providing higher values to securities denominated in a 
foreign currency.
+
IBOV Variation in the capital market index positively affects the fair value of securities and consequently the income from securities. +
NAC Control of behavioral differences in the process of fair value measurement and classification of the securities portfolio by national 
or foreign banks.
?
PRV Control of behavioral differences in the process of fair value measurement and classification of the securities portfolio by private 
or government-owned banks.
?
lnTA Control of behavioral differences in the process of fair value measurement and classification of the securities portfolio in relation 
to the size of the banking institutions.
?
The next step of the validation process is to identify the 
practice of income smoothing, where the dependent varia-
ble is not total income from securities but its discretionary 
portion (DIncSEC), measured as the error term of Model 
(3.1) - the first stage. To assess the hypothesis of income 
smoothing, the following model is applied, which constitu-
tes the second stage of the Model (3.1):
DIncSECi,t = β0 + βi + β1(NPi,t - IncSECi,t)+ β2ΔEVAi,t +
                  βSNACi + β4PRVi+β5lnTAi,t + εi,t .        3.3
As observed, apart from a change in the dependent va-
riable, Model (3.3) follows the same construction logic as 
Model (3.2) for the assessment of earnings management, 
except that variables SEC, BIR, and GDP are excluded be-
cause they have already been considered in the calculation 
of the non-discretionary portion of the income from se-
curities in Model (3.1). Confirmation of the hypothesis of 
income smoothing in Model (3.3) is dependent on the sta-
tistical significance and negative sign on the variable (NP-
IncSEC), while the observation of the use of classification of 
the portfolio for earnings management purposes depends 
on the evidence obtained in relation to the variable ΔEVA, 
similar to Model (3.2).
Thus, the validation of Model (3.1) depends on the 
identification in Model (3.3) of results equivalent to those 
calculated in Model (3.2) for the variables related to inco-
me smoothing. Consistent with this assumption, the results 
from the estimation of the discretionary portion of the in-
come from securities, according to Model (3.3) and sum-
marized in Table 5, are expected.
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 Table 5   Summary of expected relationships in explaining the non-discretionary portion of the income from securities 
(DIncSEC) using Model (3.3)
Variable Expected relationship Sign
NP-IncSEC The discretionary activity in IncSEC increases (decreases) when earnings before profits and losses on securities are lower (higher), 
confirming the hypothesis of earnings management.
-
ΔEVA The use of the classification of the available-for-sale securities portfolio as a tool for earnings management is reflected in the ne-
gative association between the discretionary activity of income from securities and variation in the Equity Valuation Adjustment 
account.
-
NAC Control of behavioral differences in the process of fair value measurement and classification of the securities portfolio by national 
or foreign banks.
?
PRV Control of behavioral differences in the process of fair value measurement and classification of the securities portfolio by private 
or government-owned banks.
?
lnTA Control of behavioral differences in the process of fair value measurement and classification of the securities portfolio in relation 
to the size of banking institutions.
?
 3.3  Sample.
The empirical tests were based on data from the 
QFS of commercial banks, multiple-purpose banks, 
and savings banks, all of which are members of the 
Brazilian Financial System (Sistema Financeiro Nacio-
nal - SFN), for the period between the third quarter of 
2002 and fourth quarter of 2010. The reason for the 
restriction of the initial sample period was the need to 
avoid the effects of the initial adoption of the criteria 
for the classification and valuation of securities defined 
in Circular BCB 3.068/2001. The approach was to work 
with data produced after the closing of the first semi-
annual balance sheet after the effective date of the rule 
to avoid any "noise" caused by adjustments in the por-
tfolio when the rule was first adopted.
Given the parameters that define the sample and 
the QFS disclosed on the BCB website, data from 207 
commercial banks, multiple-purpose banks, and savings 
banks were considered. In the preliminary data analy-
sis, several observations were made that provided strong 
evidence of inconsistencies or particular situations that 
were usually associated with startup periods or periods 
during which the institutions' operations were disconti-
nued. To avoid the risk of contaminated test results cau-
sed by anomalous situations that presented a clear dis-
proportion between income and the assets invested, 16 
observations were excluded from the database (all were 
at least 4 standard deviations from the mean), resulting 
in 5,827 bank observations per quarter.
 4 RESulTS
As a precondition to ensure the robustness of the 
results from the estimation of Models (3.1), (3.2), and 
(3.3), Im, Pesaran, and Shin unit root tests were per-
formed, as shown in Table A.1 (Appendix), to check 
the condition of stationarity of the non-dichotomous 
series, and the null hypothesis of a unit root was rejec-
ted in all of them. The risk of spurious regressions was 
thereby eliminated.
Additionally, prior to model estimation, Pearson’s 
Correlation Matrix was applied between the regressors, 
as shown in Tables A.2 and A.3 (Appendix), to assess the 
correlation between the explanatory variables of the tes-
ted models, which could reflect a high degree of multi-
collinearity and could even result in changes in the signs 
of the coefficients for the variables of interest. The rule 
of thumb suggested by Kennedy (1998) that the risk of 
multicollinearity is a serious problem when the correla-
tion coefficients between the regressors are high - higher 
than 0.8 - was considered. One case of a high correlation 
coefficient close to that limit was identified - a positive 
correlation of 0.78 between holdings of government se-
curities (TPF) and concentration of government bonds 
in the portfolio (GOV), which can be explained by the 
low representativeness of state and municipal bonds. 
Thus, to minimize the risk of multicollinearity in the 
results, these variables are not jointly included when es-
timating Models (3.1) and (3.2).
 4.1  Specification of the non-discretionary 
Portion of Income from Securities.
A first condition to establish the consistency of the 
proposed two-stage model is that the results for the ex-
planatory variables in the first stage are consistent with 
the theoretical assumptions. For this purpose, specifi-
cation of the non-discretionary portion of the income 
from securities was developed with the estimation of 
Model (3.1) using the cross-sectional fixed-effects pa-
nel data methodology, the results of which are shown 
in Table 6.
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 Table 6  Results of cross-sectional fixed-effects regression estimation for identification of discretionary activity in income 
from securities.
Model tested:
IncSECi,t = β0 + βi + β1SECi,t-1 + β2ΔSECi,t + β3BIRt + β4GDPt + β5CAMt + β6IBOVt + ψ1 <TYPi,t>+ ψ2 <MATi,t> + ψ3 <CONi,t> + εi,t
Const SEC(-1) ΔSEC BIR GDP EXCH IBOV TPF STMN CDBB
0.013 0.019 0.025 0.024 -0.045 0.030 0.004 0.002 -0.023 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.659) (0.065) (0.000) (0.536) (0.141) (0.392) (0.876)
*** *** *** * ***
DEBSH WMD U12M U5Y U15Y L10PR L50PR L100PR OPR
0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.166) (0.159) (0.153) (0.155) (0.107) (0.517) (0.954) (0.818) (0.326)
Period: 4th qtr/2002 to 4th qtr/2010
Number of observations: 5.823 Number of banks: 207
R2: 0.2979 F statistic: 10.6071
Adjusted R2: 0.2699 p-value (F): 0.0000
DW statistic: 1.6468 Hausman test: 38.7266
Chow test: 6.8083 p-value (Hausman) 0.0031
IncSEC is the income from securities, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period; SEC is the balance of the securities portfolio, scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the period; ΔSEC is the variation in portfolio securities, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period; BIR is the base inte-
rest rate of the economy in real terms; GDP is the variation of the Gross Domestic Product at base values; EXCH is the real variation in the exchange rate; 
IBOV is real Ibovespa growth, TYP is the proportion of the securities portfolio represented in the five categories of investments – Brazilian government 
bonds (TPF), state, or municipal securities (STMN), CDBs, real estate, and mortgage bonds (CDBB), debentures and shares (DEBSH), and other securities 
(OS); MAT is the proportion of the securities portfolio distributed according to the maturity of the financial instruments - without maturity date (WMD), up 
to 12 months (U12M), more than 1 and up to 5 years (U5Y), more than 5 to 15 years (U15Y), and more than 15 years (M15Y); CON is the degree of con-
centration in the securities portfolio, which identifies the proportion of the portfolio applied to government issuers (GOV), the 10 largest private issuers 
(L10PR), the following 50 largest private issuers (L50PR), the following 100 largest private issuers (L100PR), and the other private issuers (OPR).
Legend for the significance level of the parameters: at 1% (***), at 5% (**), and at 10% (*). Figures between parentheses are the parameters’ p-values.
Consistent with the hypothesis proposed in Section 3.1, 
significant positive parameters were found for the variables 
SEC(-1) and ΔSEC, indicating that income from securities 
is related to the size of the resources invested in the por-
tfolio, which cannot be attributed to the discretionary ac-
tions of management. A positive relationship between Inc-
SEC and the exchange rate variation variable (EXCH) was 
also observed, confirming the expectations outlined in the 
construction of the model. For the GDP variable, a negative 
relationship was found, indicating that in times of greater 
economic growth there is a decrease in the relative income 
from securities, which can be explained by the trade-off 
with loan transactions, i.e., in periods of greater economic 
dynamism, a natural transfer of resources for loans may oc-
cur, reducing the proportion of income from securities in 
relation to total assets.
For the IBOV variable, the expected positive rela-
tionship with income from securities was not confirmed, 
which could be explained by the low proportion of proper-
ty securities in the portfolio. In the case of the BIR variable, 
no significant relationship was found, which constitutes 
evidence of the dichotomy highlighted in Section 3.1 that a 
variation in interest rates can have different effects on the 
fair value of securities, depending on whether the rate is 
pre-fixed or is a floating rate indexed to the Selic rate.
The effects of type, maturity, and degree of concen-
tration of the securities portfolio were also controlled 
for. There were no significant associations found betwe-
en income from securities and the variables that cons-
titute the vectors TYP, MAT, and CON. One potential 
explanation for this result could be the detailing of these 
vectors. Additionally, it is noteworthy that for the speci-
fication of the non-discretionary portion, the portion of 
cross-sectional fixed-effects (βi) is considered in addi-
tion to the coefficients of the variables and the constant. 
The error term corresponds to the discretionary portion 
of income from securities.
 4.2  Identification of Income Smoothing using a 
one-Stage Model.
The first test consists of applying Model (3.2) to con-
firm the hypothesis of income smoothing using securities 
from Brazilian financial institutions. The results are sum-
marized in Table 7.
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 Table 7  Results of cross-sectional fixed-effects regressions tests  using the one-stage model for identifying income 
smoothing
Model tested: 
IncSECi,t = β0 + βi + β1(NPi,t - IncSECi,t)+ β2ΔEVAi,t + β3SECi,t + β4BIRt + β5GDPt + β6EXCHt +  β7IBOV + β8NACi + β9PRVi+β10ln TAi,t  + εi,t
Const NP-IncSEC ΔEVA SEC BIR GDP EXCH IBOV
0.018 -0.226 -0.111 0.023 0.005 -0.026 0.025 0.004
(0.025) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.893) (0.134) (0.000) (0.332)





Period: 3rd qtr/2002 to 4th qtr/2010
Number of observations: 5,827 Number of banks: 206
R2: 0.4177 F statistic: 18.7183
 Adjusted R2: 0.3953 p-value (F): 0.0000
DW statistic: 1.6759 Hausman test: 34.9058
Chow test: 7.5115 p-value (Hausman) 0.0001
IncSEC is the income from securities, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period; NP is the net profit, scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the period; ΔEVA is the variation in the Equity Valuation Adjustment account, scaled by total assets 
at the beginning of the period; SEC is the balance of the securities portfolio, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
period; BIR is the base interest rate of the economy in real terms; GDP is the variation of the Gross Domestic Product at base 
values; EXCH is the real variation in the exchange rate; IBOV is the real Ibovespa growth; NAC takes a value of 1 for financial 
institutions under the control of national capital and 0 for the rest; PRV takes a value of 1 for financial institutions with private 
capital and 0 for the rest; and lnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Legend for the significance level of the parameters: at 1% (***), at 5% (**), and at 10% (*). P-values between parentheses.
The statistical significance and the negative sign of 
the variable (NP-IncSEC) in explaining the IncSEC va-
riable are consistent with the hypothesis of using inco-
me from securities for the purpose of income smoo-
thing. This corroborates the findings of Zenderski 
(2005), Monteiro and Grateron (2006), Santos (2007), 
and Goulart (2007). A significant and inverse rela-
tionship between the explanatory variable and ΔEVA 
shows that banks use the classification of the available-
for-sale portfolio in these discretionary management 
actions. 
Regarding control variables, positive relationships 
were found between income from securities and: (i) the 
balance of the securities portfolio, which was natural and 
predictable, (ii) the exchange rate variation, demonstra-
ting its relevance in the valuation of the portfolio as a re-
sult of being a remuneration parameter of certain secu-
rities, and (iii) financial institutions with private capital, 
demonstrating that these banks recorded higher income 
from securities than entities under government control. 
An inverse relationship was also observed between Inc-
SEC and the size of institutions, represented by lnTA, in-
dicating that smaller-sized banks recorded a higher pro-
portion of income from securities relative to total assets. 
For the variables BIR, GDP, and NAC, no relevant para-
meters were identified, demonstrating that the net effects 
of the real base interest rate of the economy, the level of 
economic activity, and whether the capital control of the 
institution has foreign participation are not relevant to in-
come from securities. 
 4.3 Identification of Income Smoothing using a 
Two-Stage Model.
The main parameter of the validation process of the 
two-stage model developed in the present study is the 
comparison of its results with those obtained using the 
one-stage model, highlighted in Section 4.2. The hypo-
thesis of income smoothing using securities is tested in 
the Brazilian banking market using the two-stage Model 
(3.3), in which the dependent variable DIncSEC corres-
ponds to the error term of Model (3.1). The results of 
this test are summarized in Table 8.
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 Table 8   Results of cross-sectional fixed-effects regression tests  using the two-stage model for identifying income smoothing
Model tested:
DIncSECi,t = β0 + βi + β1(NPi,t - IncSECi,t)+ β2ΔEVAi,t + βSNACi + β4PRVi+β5ln TAi,t + ε
Const NP-IncSEC ΔEVA NAC PRV lnTA
0.011 -0.224 -0.105 0.001 0.008 -0.001
(0.166) (0.000) (0.087) (0.825) (0.086) (0.001)
*** * * ***
Period: 3rd qtr/2002 to 4th qtr/2010
Number of observations: 5,817 Number of banks: 206
R2: 0.1650 F statistic: 5.2770
 Adjusted R2: 0.1338 p-value (F): 0.0000
DW statistic: 1.7098 Hausman test: 235.5947
Chow test: 1.3941 p-value (Hausman) 0.0000
DIncSEC is the discretionary portion of income from securities, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period, which corresponds to the error term 
resulting from the estimation of Model (3.1); NP is the net profit, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period; IncomeSEC is the income from 
securities, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period; ΔEVA is the variation in the Equity Valuation Adjustment account, scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of the period; NAC takes a value of 1 for financial institutions under the control of national capital and 0 for the rest; PRV takes a value of 1 
for financial institutions with private capital and 0 for the rest; and lnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Legend for the significance level of the parameters: at 1% (***), at 5% (**), and at 10% (*). P-values in parentheses.
The statistical significance and negative sign of the va-
riables (NP-IncSEC) and ΔEVA show similar results to those 
found with the one-stage model (Table 7), reinforcing the 
hypothesis of earnings management by income smoothing 
using securities, including the possibility of classification of 
securities in the available-for-sale category. The reasoning 
behind these models is that banks discretionarily increase 
the income from securities using subjectivity in the valua-
tion or classification of the portfolio (available-for-sale) to 
increase (or decrease) profits in an attempt to avoid marked 
variations that can convey a perception of greater risk to 
the market.
Regarding the control variables, the results show 
that the larger-sized banks (lnTA) are less likely to 
adopt discretionary actions with respect to income 
from securities. This practice is more common among 
private banks. No significant differences were found 
with regard to the adoption of discretion in the measu-
rement of securities among banks under the control of 
national or foreign capital.
The main conclusion from these tests is that Model 
(3.1), which was constructed to identify the discretio-
nary portion of income from securities, is robust with 
respect to the identification of earnings management 
in a similar manner to the results for the one-stage mo-
del - a method widely used in the literature to assess 
income smoothing using securities.
 4.4  Procedures to Ensure Robustness of the 
Tests.
In addition to the unit root tests and the procedu-
res used to minimize the risk of multicollinearity, other 
technical procedures were adopted to ensure the robus-
tness of the results. To evaluate the existence of indi-
vidual effects, which justifies the use of panel data, a 
test suggested by Baltagi (2008) was performed. This is 
the Chow test because of its similarity with the struc-
tural break test. In line with the statistics incorporated 
in Tables 6, 7, and 8, the null hypothesis that the results 
calculated without considering individual heterogenei-
ty were appropriate was rejected, demonstrating the 
importance of the use of panel data to provide eviden-
ce with greater informational power when applying the 
models in question.
To determine the panel data method to be used, i.e., 
fixed or random models, the Hausman test was per-
formed for the three specified models according to the 
statistics shown in Tables 6, 7 and 8. The null hypothe-
sis that estimators of fixed and random effects of the 
models do not significantly differ was rejected, whi-
ch makes the use of the method with random effects 
inappropriate. The fixed-effects method was therefore 
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used. Moreover, according to Gujarati (2006), the basis 
of the random-effects model is that the errors are ran-
dom extractions from a much larger population, which 
is not the case in the present study, which considers all 
banking institutions of interest.
Finally, despite the adoption of scaling of the variables 
IncSEC, SEC, ΔSEC, (NP-IncSEC), and ΔEVA by total as-
sets at the beginning of the period to minimize the risk of 
heteroskedasticity, and the fact that Durbin-Watson test 
statistics, highlighted in Tables 6, 7, and 8, fell within the 
"inconclusive" zone, the Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE) method for cross-sectional fixed-effects of panel 
data was used as a precaution to generate robust results 
even in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity in the residuals.
The adjusted goodness of fit coefficients (R2) of the 
regressions, highlighted in Tables 6, 7, and 8, show that 
Models (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) explain 26.99%, 39.53%, 
and 13.38%, respectively, of the behavior of the corres-
ponding dependent variables. It should be noted, ho-
wever, that these results are not sufficient to compare 
the levels of determination of the one- and two-stage 
models adequately because the one-stage model, the 
results of which are summarized in Table 7, explains 
the total income from securities, whereas the two-stage 
model only isolates and assesses the determinants of 
the discretionary portion of the income from securi-
ties, as shown in Table 8. It should also be emphasized 
that the contribution of the two-stage model does not 
necessarily lie in its superiority to a one-stage model 
but as a validated instrument that enables the resolu-
tion of research problems that depend on the identi-
fication of the discretionary portion of income from 
securities.
 5 ConCluSIonS
The present study was aimed at developing and 
validating a two-stage model for the identification of 
discretionary activity of accruals from securities by 
banking institutions. The development of the proposed 
model is based on the precepts of the few studies on the 
subject, the incorporation, by analogy, of the parame-
ters used in two-stage models to identify discretiona-
ry LLP in banks, the consideration of macroeconomic 
variables that may be involved in the evaluation of fi-
nancial instruments, and the specific attributes of the 
securities portfolio of each bank.
The empirical procedures were focused on the va-
lidation process of this model. For this purpose, the 
results are compared with those obtained using a one-
stage model – aiming to strengthen the use of this type 
of methodology for the analysis of earnings manage-
ment of securities in banks. As a reference, a model 
for identifying the practice of income smoothing is 
defined, taking into account that previous studies also 
identified this type of earnings management by Brazi-
lian banking institutions.
The tests were performed using the financial state-
ments of commercial banks, multiple-purpose banks, 
and savings banks from the third quarter of 2002 to the 
fourth quarter of 2010. Using the one-stage reference 
model, negative and significant relationships were con-
firmed between income from securities and the follo-
wing variables: profit before income from securities, 
which were consistent with the hypothesis identified in 
previous studies on the use of portfolio classification 
for the purpose of income smoothing; and the variation 
in the Equity Valuation Adjustment account, which ac-
crues the variations in the value of securities classified as 
available-for-sale, indicating that banks use this type of 
classification in their managerial actions.
The proposed two-stage model was subsequently 
tested, isolating the discretionary portion of income 
from securities. The results show that the use of discre-
tion in income from securities is negatively related to 
profit before income from securities and with the va-
riation in Equity Valuation Adjustments. Thus, the re-
sults obtained with the developed model are consistent 
with those found with the reference model, i.e., they 
confirm that Brazilian banks use income from securi-
ties for the purpose of income smoothing and that the 
classification of the available-for-sale portfolio is used 
in discretionary actions.
The main conclusion from the tests is that the mo-
del constructed to identify the discretionary portion 
of income from securities is validated. This model is 
robust because it can identify earnings management in 
a similar manner to the one-stage model that was used 
as a reference.
The contribution of the present study is the develo-
pment of a two-stage model that creates conditions for 
studies that aim to not only determine whether earnings 
management is practiced but also to associate earnings 
management with other variables. In the present study, 
for example, the estimation of the one-stage referen-
ce model revealed evidence of the practice of income 
smoothing and the use of classification of the portfolio 
for earnings management. The control variables show 
that private and smaller-sized banks record income 
from securities, scaled by total assets, to a greater extent 
than larger-sized banks and banks under government 
control, but these results do not allow us to determine 
whether there is more or less manipulation in these ins-
titutions. In the case of the two-stage model, in addition 
to confirming the same evidence regarding the practice 
of smoothing and the use of classification of securities 
for earnings management, we find that this management 
practice is more common in smaller-sized banks and 
banks controlled by private capital because they obtain 
a larger discretionary portion of income from securities. 
This difference in evidence is justified by the fact that in 
the one-stage model the dependent variable is income 
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  APPEndICES
 Table A.1  Im, Pesaran, and Shin (I.P.S.) unit root tests on non-dichotomous variables of Models (3.1), (3.2), and  (3.3)
IncSEC SEC ΔSEC BIR IBOV GDP EXCH TPF STMN CDBB DEBSH OS
I.P.S. statistic -29.4496 -11.4420 -50.6553 -7.2851 -45.2970 -27.1300 -33.7978 -2.4753 -4.7675 -739.3870 -3.2666 -10.9553
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000
WMD U12M U5Y U15Y M15Y GOV L10PR L50PR L100PR OPR ΔEVA lnTA
I.P.S. statistic -20.7373 -11.1853 -9.9223 -101.9670 -11.1333 -7.5250 -22.2764 -8.5054 -2.9461 -7.4633 -56.9885 -7.1737
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
IncSEC is the income from securities, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period; SEC is the balance of the securities portfolio, deflated by total 
assets at the beginning of the period; ΔSEC is the variation in the portfolio securities, deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period; BIR is the base 
interest rate of the economy, the annual Selic; IBOV is the Ibovespa variation; GDP is the variation in the Gross Domestic Product at base values; EXCH 
is the variation in the Brazilian real/dollar exchange rate; TYP is the proportion of the securities portfolio represented in the five investment categories – 
Brazilian government bonds (TPF), state or municipal securities (STMN), CDBs, real estate, and mortgage bonds (CDBB), debentures and shares (DEBSH), 
and other securities (OS); MAT is the proportion of the securities portfolio distributed according to the maturity of financial instruments - without maturity 
date (WMD), up to 12 months (U12M), more than 1 and up to 5 years (U5Y), more than 5 and up to 15 years (U15Y), and more than 15 years (M15Y); 
CON is the degree of concentration in the securities portfolio, which identifies the proportion of the portfolio applied to - government issuers (GOV), the 
10 largest private issuers (L10PR), the following 50 largest private issuers (L50PR), the following 100 largest private issuers (L100PR), and the other private 
issuers (OPR); ΔEVA is the variation in the Equity Valuation Adjustment account deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period; and lnTA is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. 
Note: For the variables BIR and lnTA, the test was carried out with individual intercept and trend. Other tests were conducted only with individual intercept. 
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 Table A.3  Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Models (3.2) and (3.3) regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) NP-IncSEC 1
(2) ΔEVA -0.00 1
(3) SEC -0.22 0.06 1
(4) BIR -0.08 0.06 0.11 1
(5) IBOV 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.15 1
(6) GDP 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.27 -0.30 1
(7) EXCH -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.67 0.11 1
(8) NAC 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 1
(9) PRV 0.08 0.01 -0.19 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.21 1
(10) lnTA 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.22 1
IncSEC is income from securities, deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period; NP is the net profit, deflated by total assets at the beginning of 
the period; ΔEVA is the variation in the Equity Valuation Adjustment account, deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period; SEC is the balance of 
the securities portfolio, deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period; BIR is the base interest rate of the economy, the annual Selic; IBOV is the 
Ibovespa variation; GDP is the variation of the Gross Domestic Product at base values; EXCH is the variation in the Brazilian real/dollar exchange rate; 
NAC takes a value of 1 for financial institutions under the control of national capital and 0 for the rest; PRV takes a value of 1 for financial institutions 
with private capital and 0 for the rest; and lnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets.
